Allahabad High Court Holds That Orders Under Section 156(3) CrPC Are Interlocutory and Cannot Be Challenged by Proposed Accused Before Cognizance
Introduction: A Judicial Reiteration
In a significant ruling that reinforces procedural safeguards in criminal law, the Allahabad High Court has dismissed a criminal revision filed against a magistrate’s order directing the police to register and investigate an FIR.
The order, passed by Justice Chawan Prakash on December 9, 2025, in Criminal Revision No. 6131 of 2023 (Nahni & Others vs. State of U.P. & Another), rests on a well-established legal principle laid down by a Full Bench of the same court in Father Thomas vs. State of U.P. (2010). The Allahabad High Court judgment underscores that a magistrate’s direction under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is an interlocutory order and is not open to revision at the instance of persons against whom no cognizance has been taken or process issued.
The Case at Hand: From Hathras to the High Court
The matter originated from an application filed by opposite party no. 2, Manju, before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) in Hathras. Seeking the registration of an FIR against the revisionists—Nahni and five others—the applicant invoked Section 156(3) CrPC, which empowers a magistrate to order a police investigation into a cognizable offense.
On October 30, 2023, the ACJM allowed the application and directed the local police to register an FIR and commence investigation. Aggrieved by this order, the proposed accused—the revisionists—approached the Allahabad High Court under Section 397 CrPC, which provides for the revisional jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to examine the legality of orders passed by subordinate courts.
The State’s Objection: Citing a Full Bench Authority
During the hearing, the Learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA) raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision. Relying on the Full Bench decision in Father Thomas, the AGA contended that an order under Section 156(3) CrPC is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, revision against it is barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. This provision expressly prohibits revision against interlocutory orders, thereby limiting the scope of judicial intervention at this preliminary stage.
The revisionists’ counsel, Rajesh Kumar Bind, was notably absent during the final hearing, though the court proceeded to examine the legal question given its recurring significance.
The Core Legal Question: Revisiting Father Thomas
Justice Chawan Prakash framed the issue around the three questions adjudicated by the Full Bench in Father Thomas:
- Whether an order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing police to register and investigate is open to revision at the instance of a person against whom no cognizance has been taken nor process issued?
- Whether such an order is interlocutory and revision against it barred under Section 397(2) CrPC?
- Whether the view taken in Ajay Malviya vs. State of U.P. (2000) that a revision is maintainable—and consequently a writ petition for quashing the FIR is not—is correct?
The Full Bench had answered these questions unequivocally:
- Answer to A: No revision lies at the instance of a proposed accused at this stage.
- Answer to B: The order is interlocutory; revision is barred.
- Answer to C: The view in Ajay Malviya is not correct.
Thus, the law in Uttar Pradesh is settled: a person against whom an FIR is directed to be registered on a magistrate’s order cannot challenge that order via criminal revision before the investigation even begins.
The Court’s Reasoning: Procedure Over Premature Challenge
Justice Chawan Prakash methodically applied the Full Bench ruling to the facts at hand. He noted that the revisionists were “proposed accused” against whom neither cognizance had been taken nor summons/warrants issued. All that had transpired was a direction to investigate—a preliminary step aimed at ascertaining whether evidence exists to proceed further.
The Allahabad High Court emphasized that allowing revisions at this stage would frustrate the investigative process, encourage dilatory tactics, and clog higher courts with premature challenges. The CrPC deliberately bars revisions against interlocutory orders to ensure that criminal proceedings move forward without unnecessary interruptions.
Moreover, the ruling aligns with the legislative intent behind Section 156(3), which is meant to serve as a check on police inaction in cognizable offenses. Permitting accused persons to stall investigations at the threshold would defeat this very purpose.
Broader Implications: Litigation Strategy and Access to Justice
This judgment has several important ramifications:
- Strategic Litigation: Accused persons must now await the completion of investigation or the filing of a chargesheet before challenging the proceedings. Their remedies—such as quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC or before the Supreme Court under Article 136—remain available, but only at appropriate later stages.
- Complainant’s Protection: It empowers complainants, especially in cases involving influential accused, to seek judicial intervention for FIR registration without facing immediate adversarial challenges.
- Judicial Economy: It prevents the High Court from being flooded with revisions against preliminary directives, allowing it to focus on substantive matters.
- Clarification of Conflicting Views: It resolves earlier confusion caused by conflicting division bench rulings and reaffirms the binding nature of Full Bench precedents.
Context Within Criminal Procedure
The ruling highlights the hierarchical and staged nature of criminal justice delivery. Under the CrPC:
- Investigation is a police function supervised by the judiciary.
- A magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) is merely a trigger for investigation, not an adjudication of guilt.
- Judicial review is deferred until a prima facie case is established by the police.
This staged approach balances the rights of the accused with the state’s duty to investigate crime. As held in Father Thomas and reaffirmed here, the accused’s right to challenge the proceedings is not absolute nor immediate but subject to procedural propriety.
Conclusion: A Firm Precedent Reinforced
Justice Chawan Prakash’s order, though brief, carries substantial jurisprudential weight. By dismissing the revision as not maintainable, the Allahabad High Court has once again cemented the Full Bench ruling in Father Thomas as the definitive legal position in Uttar Pradesh.
The message is clear: the judiciary will not entertain pre-emptive challenges to investigative steps. Whether this results in a fair investigation or an unjustified harassment will be determined later—but the process must be allowed to run its course.
For now, the police in Hathras will proceed with their investigation, and the revisionists will have to await the next stage in the legal journey. The Allahabad High Court’s ruling is a reminder that in criminal law, procedure is paramount, and not every order is meant to be appealed at first sight.
Case Details:
Case Title: Nahni & Others vs. State of U.P. & Another
Case No.: Criminal Revision No. 6131 of 2023
Court: Allahabad High Court
Bench: Justice Chawan Prakash
Date of Order: December 9, 2025
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